Football is “the most important of the least important things”: The Illusion of Sport and COVID-19 by Black, Jack
 1 
This is an author’s accepted manuscript for ‘Leisure Sciences’, copyright Taylor & 
Francis. 
 
Black, J. (2020). Football is “the most important of the least important things”: 
The Illusion of Sport and COVID-19. Leisure Sciences, Online First. 
 
To link to this article: 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01490400.2020.1773989  
 
Football is “the most important of the least important things”: The Illusion of 
Sport and COVID-19 
 
Dr. Jack Black, Academy of Sport and Physical Activity, Faculty of Health and 
Wellbeing, Sheffield Hallam University, Collegiate Hall, Collegiate Crescent, 
Sheffield, UK, S10 2BP 
 
  
 2 
Football is “the most important of the least important things”: The Illusion of 
Sport and COVID-19 
 
Jack Black, PhD 
Academy of Sport and Physical Activity, Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK 
 
Abstract 
In his book, On the Pleasure Principle in Culture (2014), Robert Pfaller argued that our 
relationship to sport is one grounded in “illusion”. Simply put, our interest in and 
enjoyment of sport occurs through a process of “knowing better”. Here, one’s 
knowledge of the unimportance of sport is achieved by associating the illusion of sport 
with a naïve observer – i.e. someone who does believe in sport’s importance. In the 
wake of the global pandemic, COVID-19, it would seem that Pfaller’s remarks have 
taken on an added significance. With major sporting events and domestic competitions 
being indefinitely postponed or canceled, Liverpool manager, Jurgen Klopp, 
commented that football was “the most important of the least important things”. In light 
of these remarks, this paper will critically locate sport’s sudden unimportance in 
relation to Pfaller’s contention that sport reflects an “illusion without owner”. 
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Introduction 
 
It would seem that sport no longer matters. In view of the COVID-19 global pandemic, 
which has resulted in a number of domestic and international sporting competitions 
being indefinitely postponed or cancelled, Liverpool FC manager, Jürgen Klopp, 
referred to football “as ‘the most important of the least important things’” (Wilson, 
2020). Notably, Klopp’s sentiments have been echoed by other sporting celebrities, 
such as Tiger Woods, who, in similar fashion, stated that “There are a lot more 
important things in life than a golf tournament” (Carroll, 2020).1 But who are these 
remarks for? Surely, no one would disagree with Klopp or Woods’s statements and 
suggest that sport is more important? In fact, amidst an increasing death toll and 
national “lockdowns” resulting in levels of unemployment unseen since the 2007 
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financial crash (Strauss, 2020; Tooze, 2020), do Klopp and Woods’s remarks even need 
repeating? 
In light of these questions, I wish to expand upon the nature of sport during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, paying specific attention to the inherent ambivalence that 
underscores both Klopp and Woods’s remarks. This ambivalence will be explored 
through Robert Pfaller’s contention that sport and play provide an “illusion without 
owner” (Pfaller, 2014). Drawing from Johan Huizinga’s “sacred seriousness” 
(Huizinga, 1955), Pfaller (2014) details how the significance of sport relies upon an 
inherent illusion; an illusion which presupposes a “naïve observer”. 
In what follows, it will be argued that the importance of this “naïve observer” 
proves integral to the above remarks. For example, though no one would openly 
disagree with either Klopp or Woods’s statements, the fact that they are stated, and 
subsequently reported, relies upon an Other who does believe in sport’s importance 
(even in the face of a global pandemic). In the case of sport, leisure and play, the formal 
significance of this Other will be used to discern what COVID-19 avers: the inherent 
illusion that underscores our desire for “play”; an illusion that does not belong to any 
subject – an “illusion without owner”. 
 
Enjoy! Your leisure 
 
Certainly, the commodification of leisure and the conflation of work and play is a 
widely recited theme in academic research (Jameson, 1991); culminating in the 
“gamification” of working practices (Wark, 2007). This infusion, however, belies a 
more significant tension. That is, under the neoliberal directive to “Enjoy!”, we, 
paradoxically, have less time for enjoyment (McGowan, 2012; Žižek, 2008). As a 
result, we become participants in a relentless enjoyment that is never fulfilled, and 
which inevitably becomes work: an enjoyment that is decidedly unenjoyable. Such 
demands are evidenced in the extent to which our leisure practices become embroiled 
in a constant desire for affirmation, as Van Oenen (2018) highlights: 
 
because … affirmation can no longer be received from traditional sources such 
as God or nature, or any other self-evident and undisputed source of authority, 
it can only be procured from man-made social arrangements and be based on 
assessments by other human beings. It is thus to be expected that individuals 
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will demand such continuous re-affirmation from other individuals, or 
collectives. (p.114). 
 
For Pfaller (2014), this re-affirmation “holds on to the illusion of self-determination”, 
with the subject “pursu[ing] his or her own heteronomy simply for the sake of ‘proving’ 
it to be autonomy” (p.215, italics added).2 
Unfortunately, what becomes obscured in this desire for self-affirmation 
through leisure, is its attribution to a naïve Other (Boncardo, 2018). Such a naïve Other 
follows the Lacanian contention (elaborated by Žižek, 2001) that our subjective beliefs 
are enjoyed through an Other, constituting what Pfaller (2014) refers to as “objective 
illusions”. While objective illusions ground their subscription in a variety of subjects, 
they are, nonetheless, claimed by no one: they are, in effect, disavowed. Both Pfaller 
and Žižek relate this unique process to a variety of examples, including when an 
individual uses their VCR to record films, that will never get watched; when an 
academic photocopies a book, they will never read; or, when the canned laughter on 
your favorite sitcom laughs for you. In each instance, the subject may never subjectively 
watch the films, read the book, or laugh, but instead, they can relax in the objective 
comfort that the VCR, photocopier and canned laughter has achieved this for them. 
However, what remains unique about this transference is its disavowed status. 
Notably, in each transference – what Pfaller (2014, 2017) refers to as a form of 
interpassivity – “The illusion is not theirs” (Pfaller, 2014, p.23); that is, the illusion is 
not claimed by the subject. Consequently, “in full ‘knowledge’ of the alleged 
unsuitability of an interpassive process, the actors nonetheless carry it out, and then 
actually obtain successful results from it – yet once again conceal these results from 
themselves” (Pfaller, 2014, p.23). This is reflected in the case of sport, where the desire 
to “check the score”, and thus stop whatever one may be currently doing, relies upon 
the subject’s open acknowledgement that such “checking” is inherently “silly” (“I know 
this is silly, but I just have to know the score from yesterday’s game”).3 This 
concealment bears witness to an important ambivalence in cultural practices involving 
sport, leisure and play. In part, it suggests that the enjoyment we seek through our 
leisure practices, including watching professional sport, is one in which the interpassive 
subject deliberately follows a path of self-forgetting. 
In order to help explain this act of self-forgetting, we can consider what has 
been referred to as sport’s “mimetic sphere” (Elias & Dunning, 2008; Maguire, 2011). 
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According to Maguire (2011), “‘Mimetic’ activities … provide a ‘make-believe’ setting 
which allows emotions to flow more easily, and which elicits excitement of some kind 
imitating that produced by ‘real-life situations’, yet without its dangers or risks” 
(p.920). Importantly, “‘Mimetic’ activities thus allow, within certain limits, for socially 
permitted self-centredness” (Maguire, 2011, p.920). In light of the above, we can offer 
a slight revision to Maguire’s (2011) contentions, arguing instead that what these 
activities collectively provide is a form “self-decentrement”, predicated on our own 
self-forgetfulness. 
 
Sacred seriousness and knowing better 
 
Following Huizinga (1955), Pfaller (2014) outlines how forms of play rely upon a level 
of secrecy which is shared by those involved in the practice. This is echoed in examples 
of politeness where, “The fact that niceties are ‘not real’ is thus a secret that is shared 
by all participants, and one that is kept secret from others who remain fully unspecified” 
(Pfaller, 2014, pp.89-90). In these instances, such “secrecy” relies upon an “illusion” 
that remains “ownerless” (Pfaller, 2014). What is more, it is in upholding this illusion 
that the enjoyment of play and sport relies upon the knowledge, and subsequent 
disavowal, that it is merely play. As Pfaller (2014) asserts: 
 
A player who does not know that the game is play cannot be captured by “sacred 
seriousness”. He or she remains trapped in profane seriousness. This knowledge 
essential for play consists in “knowing better” about an illusion. Consequently, 
every game must contain an illusion. (p.91). 
 
Therefore, if we follow Maguire’s (2011) contention that the “make-believe” settings 
of our leisure practices serve as “the ‘siblings’ of those aroused in ‘real-life’ situations” 
(p.920), then it is clear that such forms of “make-believe” refer explicitly to play’s 
inherent illusion. Importantly, the fact that such activities are known to be “make-
believe”, works to accentuate their seriousness. If anything, it underscores play’s 
seriousness in the face of our everyday (“real-life”) profanatory (Pfaller, 2014). 
Furthermore, this is not a confusion. One does not simply confuse the “play” as more 
seriousness than “everyday life”; instead, the sacred seriousness of play occurs when 
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“the players are not confused. Only by knowing that it is ‘just’ play is it possible to be 
more absorbed by it than by other areas of life” (Pfaller, 2014, p.92, italics added). 
As noted, what remains key to such “knowing”, is its disavowed status. Play, 
and its rationalization in a variety of sporting and leisure practices, works off a 
“suspended illusion”; or, in other words, a suspension of our better knowledge (Pfaller, 
2014). For Pfaller (2014): 
 
Because this knowledge includes the fact that the game is “only a game”, the 
game must contain a counter-illusion, so to speak – namely, that of being “more 
than just a game”. This emerges as an important observation for understanding 
other, non-representative practices, too (such as abstract, repetitive forms in art, 
obsessional neurotic acts, and religious rituals that have seemingly lost their 
meaning): wherever sacred seriousness reigns, there must be a denied illusion 
that is kept suspended. Sacred seriousness is a sign indicating the presence of 
an illusion of the other. It is its symptom. (pp.99-100). 
 
This affords further clarification on the apparent distinction between sport’s inherent 
tensions and its similarity to other cultural art forms (Elias & Dunning, 2008). 
According to Maguire (2011), sport’s “quest … for battles [is] enacted playfully in a 
contrived context which can produce enjoyable battle excitement with a minimum of 
injuries to the human participants” (p.922, italics added). As a result, “Compared with 
the arts, the scope for the exercise of the imagination involved appears to be of a rather 
restricted and heavily rule-bound kind” (Maguire, 2011, p.922). On the contrary, when 
considered in view of the “illusion without owner”, we can begin to see how it is 
through sport’s “contrived context” that our imaginations and our enjoyment in play is 
interpassively assured. Only a naïve observer would find the restriction of activity, 
through sport’s rule-bound necessity, as in some way inhibiting the opportunity for 
play. Instead, play’s sacred seriousness can occur precisely because there are accepted 
rules that restrict the full opportunity for enjoyment. 
Take, for example, a game of football, and ask yourself: why do we bother 
restricting the game to the primary use of feet? Why do we add this “rule” which only 
restricts the opportunity to put the ball in the opposition’s net? Certainly, no one who 
plays football ever questions this rule (in fact, if they did, they may prefer another sport, 
such as, Rugby Union/League); instead, it is part of the game’s “secrecy” – an accepted 
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illusion that allows one to fully participate in the game. Moreover, rather than reflecting 
an unstable decontrolling of emotional constraint (Elias & Dunning, 2008), this reversal 
of our knowledge – the knowledge that play is merely play – is what can be identified 
when certain athletes break “the rules”, resulting in suspension or outright castration 
from sport. Ultimately, such actions only confer play’s sacred seriousness (its 
disavowed illusion): one must break the rules to win “the game”. 
It is in this way that our involvement in sport presents a form of “self-
decentrement”: indeed, a space between sport’s objective adherence (i.e. following its 
rules) and our subjective divestment from the demands of its illusion (an illusion of the 
Other). In doing so, both sport and leisure can help to confer a form of self-
forgetfulness, one that stands apart from the unending and inevitably impossible “self-
realization” that the leisure industry so hopefully promotes (Rojek, 1993). 
 
Sport’s inherent ambivalence and COVID-19 
 
We can now begin to see the ambivalence which sits at the heart of sport; an 
ambivalence which is brought to light in the aforementioned comments from Klopp. 
Indeed, while Klopp’s remarks serve as a denouncement of sport in the face of COVID-
19, at the same time, he bears witness to the “sacred seriousness” it relies upon 
(Huizinga, 1955). When Klopp asserts that football remains “the most important of the 
least important things” (Wilson, 2020), it is clear that football holds some importance. 
Yet, what underscores Klopp’s assertions is an inherent ambivalence regarding the 
“importance” of football; one that remains indebted to a naïve observer who 
wholeheartedly believes in football’s importance. Consequently, such remarks 
ambivalently herald both positive and negative assumptions: football is the most 
important of the least important things. In effect, it is precisely because football is 
“unimportant” (or the least important) that it remains important. Ultimately, Klopp’s 
remarks help reveal the suspended illusion which underlies football’s (un)importance. 
Furthermore, it is the contention of this essay, that such ambivalence can reveal 
the significance of play’s self-decentrement. Indeed, if we follow Pfaller’s (2014) 
contentions, then it is in the context of play that the illusions we uphold, but disavow, 
can be deferred to an Other who underpins the illusion’s social efficacy. It is in 
delegating the illusion to a naïve observer that we regain a sense of enjoyment from the 
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process of delegation itself. This is further substantiated by Pfaller (2014) and Žižek’s 
(1998) claims that the delegation of enjoyment can result in a surplus enjoyment. 
In the case of sport, such outsourcing of enjoyment functions even when the 
literal postponement of sport occurs. What the cancellation of sport seems to highlight, 
therefore, is how “the strongest emotional ties to something can develop precisely when 
the matter – through real or imagined better knowledge – is declared to be ‘foolish’ fun 
or ‘mere’ play” (Pfaller, 2014, p.93). Here, the postponement of sport during COVID-
19 has resulted in a number of daft examples. 
During the first postponement of English Premiership League games, Watford 
and Leicester City played their fixture via the managerial simulator, Football Manager 
(Sega, 2019) (BBC Sport, 2020). Echoing this, Leyton Orient asked fans to select the 
team for their game at Bradford City, which included pre-match advice from their 
manager, Ross Embleton. In addition, Southampton took part in a game of noughts and 
crosses with Manchester City (BBC Sport, 2020). What remains unique to these 
examples, is that they were followed with match reports from the BBC. In fact, despite 
sport’s “official” postponement, Bull (2020) highlighted that “sport [… could] be found 
in the most unlikely places”. He commented upon: 
 
the viral clips of the two men playing paddle tennis between their neighbouring 
windows on the fourth floor of their apartment block (their rally lasted 28 shots) 
and the pair playing ping pong with frying pans and a net made out of pasta 
boxes. Or Ian Bell lacing a bog roll down the corridor for four (“Don’t bowl 
there, son,” he tells his kid) or Lionel Messi doing keepie-uppies with one 
(which brought to mind Michel Platini’s line: “What Zidane does with a ball, 
Maradona could do with an orange.”). (Bull, 2020). 
 
In each example, sport’s illusion for the Other proves particularly captivating, resulting 
in a host of “silly” activities (including the strange proliferation of “online” quiz 
events),4 that, in light of play’s sacred seriousness, seems only to compel individuals to 
think up different ways of doing “sport”. Accordingly, while governments have 
undoubtedly struggled with the aim of increasing physical participation amongst its 
population, the cancelation of sport, and the subsequent “lockdown”, has only resulted 
in a number of people deliberately taking the opportunity to complete their leisure 
allocation (Cabinet Office, 2020). 
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Final Comments 
 
To conclude, we can reflect upon the ambivalent satisfaction which these examples 
seem to infer. As Poulard (2013) asserts, “The displacement of enjoyment can be 
viewed in two different lights: either as an ineluctable symptom of alienation inherent 
to mass entertainment or as the opening of a space of relative freedom where (for a 
change) nothing is expected of me” (p.306). Set against our pre-COVID-19 reality, 
where one was expected to join a gym, check the scores and “find time” with the family, 
it is our present reality – one that goes no further than the basics required for living – 
which suddenly denotes a “nothing expected” (Poulard, 2013). It is, instead, the 
unexpectedness of a future that helps to confer a level of self-forgetfulness that is 
brought to light in our relations with play, leisure and sport. In doing so play’s naïve 
observer reveals a self-decentrement that remains decidedly collective. Indeed, when 
sport inevitably returns, when leisure becomes what we do “at the weekend”, we can 
perhaps take greater stock of the interpassivity which underscores our most cherished 
and self-affirming practices. Practices that are “less encumbered by aggressive demands 
for recognition and more attuned to truly public questions – questions of distribution, 
of shared history, and of justice” (Boncardo, 2018, p.307). It is in this regard that our 
leisure can offer a more liberating, non-alienated significance. 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 Woods was referring to the 2020 Masters Tournament. 
2 According to Pfaller (2017), this process has heralded a decline in “public space”. 
3 See Pfaller (2014, p.1). 
4 See Brennan (2020). 
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